In spite of the fact that many durable products are sold through dealers, the literature has largely ignored the issue of how product durability affects the interactions between a manufacturer and her dealer(s). We seek to fill this gap by considering a durable goods manufacturer that uses an independent dealer(s) to get her product to consumers. If the manufacturer sells her product to the dealer, then the dealer can either sell or lease it to the final consumer. On the other hand, if the manufacturer leases her product to the dealer, then the dealer is forced to lease it to the consumer. We first characterize the equilibrium for a manufacturer who distributes through a single dealer as a function of the costs of production and distribution. Among other things, we show that the selling and leasing decisions of the two channel partners should balance operational efficiency against the mitigation of time inconsistency. Subsequently, we characterize the equilibrium for a manufacturer who distributes through multiple dealers as a function of the intensity of interdealer competition. One of our more interesting findings is that, when the level of competition among dealers is high, the manufacturer prefers to lease the product to her dealers, which forces them to lease to consumers. This complements existing results that show that when suppliers of durable goods interact directly with consumers, then selling becomes the dominant strategy when competitive intensity is high.
Introduction
Much of the research on durable goods focuses on the issue of whether products should be sold or leased. However, little attention has be paid to how intermediaries affect this issue in spite of the fact that they play an important role in many durable goods industries. Consider as examples the automobile and entertainment video (DVD and VHS) industries. Although they differ in conventional respects, these two industries share some common characteristics. First, intermediaries play an important role in both of them. In the auto industry, OEMs rely nearly exclusively upon dealers for distribution, and in entertainment videos, studios distribute their products through specialized outlets such as Blockbuster, Hollywood, etc. as well as through general retailers, e.g. Wal-Mart. Second, the products in both industries are durable in the sense that they provide value over time. 1 Finally, in both the automobile and entertainment video industries, a combination of leasing and selling are employed. Yet, although the effects of product durability and distribution channel structure have been well studied in isolation, little is known about how product durability influences the interactions between a manufacturer and its dealer(s).
It has long been recognized that product durability can have adverse consequences for a supplier that sells its product. When a durable goods monopolist sells her product, she has an incentive to skim the demand curve by producing at a rate that, over time, drives down prices. However, because consumers anticipate this opportunistic behavior, fewer consumers are willing to buy at any given price. This issue has been referred to as time inconsistency in reference to the fact that a monopolist's ability to sell a durable good at a price above marginal cost is inconsistent with her own incentives to produce at a rate that causes the price of the product to decrease. It is well known that one way for the manufacturer to mitigate the problem of time inconsistency is by leasing instead of selling her product. By leasing, the manufacturer internalizes the effect of her future output, eliminating the problem of time inconsistency.
It has also been widely recognized that the use of independent intermediaries, i.e. dealers, can have important implications for a channel of distribution. The externalities that are introduced when each channel member seeks to maximize its own profits lead to higher prices and lower quantities than those that would maximize the combined channel profit. However, product durability intro-duces another dimension to the relationship between a manufacturer and dealer that needs to be addressed. Specifically, if the manufacturer sells her product to a dealer, the dealer determines not only the number of units to buy but also whether to lease or sell them to an end consumer. On the other hand, if the manufacturer leases to the dealer, then the dealer determines only the quantity to lease to the end consumer.
In this paper, we specifically address the issue of how product durability affects the interactions between a manufacturer and dealer(s). In §2, we review and analyze the literatures on product durability and on channel structure. In §3, we develop a model to capture the interaction between the manufacturer of a durable product and a single dealer. Here we focus on how the costs of production and distribution affect the equilibrium selling and leasing decisions. Subsequently, in §4, we consider a setting in which the manufacturer interacts with multiple dealers and characterize the equilibrium as a function of the intensity of competition among these dealers. Finally, in §5 we summarize the managerial implications discuss directions for future research.
Relevant Literature
Durable goods has long been studied in the industrial organization literature where it has been established that durability can interfere with a monopolistic manufacturer's extraction of rents from consumers. The reason for this, is that after a manufacturer sells its durable product to some subset of the market, it has an incentive to continue production, selling its output at lower and lower prices. Coase (1972) conjectures that if rational consumers anticipate this behavior, then prices should fall down to competitive levels. This line of thought is formalized by Bulow (1982) and Stokey (1981) who propose that, by leasing the DG, a manufacturer can avoid the time inconsistency problem.
Later research identifies conditions under which the Coase conjecture does not apply, resulting in prices that are above marginal costs. Notable among these are the works by Conlisk et al. (1984) who model constant inflow of new consumers, Bond and Samuelson (1984) who incorporate replacement sales, Kahn (1986) who studies increasing marginal production costs and Bagnoli et al. (1980) who use discrete demand.
Research on durable goods has been pursued in two main directions. The first of these examines the relationship between durability and a firm's incentive to innovate. Prominent among these are the works by Levinthal and Purohit (1989) and Waldman (1993) who argue that the incentive for a durable goods manufacturer to make the existing product obsolete by introducing a newer version is high and this can intensify the time inconsistency effect. Similar issues have also been analyzed by Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001) . The other main direction in durable goods research explores how the competitive environment affects a firm's decision to lease or sell its product. Bulow (1986) models the durability choice in an oligopoly and finds that the lease/sales ratio is decreasing in the number of firms in the market. Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) demonstrate that selling can dominate leasing when there is a threat of entry from competitive firms or actual competition among firms.
Competition is also examined by Desai and Purohit (1999) , who show that in a duopoly, firms tend to prefer selling over leasing when their products are sufficiently substitutable. In another related work, Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005) show that when the demand for a durable good depends on the availability of complementary goods, selling stimulates demand for complementary products and can benefit the manufacturer of the durable good.
However, most of the research on durable goods has ignored the role of intermediaries in a distribution channel, assuming instead that the manufacturer interacts directly with consumers. There are few notable exceptions to this: Purohit (1995) shows that in the absence of contracts, a manufacturer who uses an intermediary would prefer one who sells rather than leases. More recently, Desai et al. (2004) and Arya and Mittendorf (2005) , show that, by entering into appropriately specified contracts with intermediaries, a durable goods manufacturer can commit to restricting her output and mitigate the time inconsistency problem. Similar issues have also been considered in Purohit and Staelin (1994); Purohit (1997) . Our paper differs from these in several respects: First, we restrict ourselves to linear contracts which are common in practice and easy to implement (Lariviere and Porteus, 2001) . Second, instead of assuming that the manufacturer sells the product to the dealer(s) who subsequently sells it to consumers, we allow the manufacturer the option of leasing the product to dealer(s). If the manufacturer sells, then we allow the dealer(s) the choice between leasing and selling to consumers. Finally, we allow for competition between dealers and examine how the intensity of inter-dealer competition influences lease vs. sell decisions of the manufacturer and dealers.
Since our primary interest is to understand the role of intermediaries in the distribution of durable goods, our work is also closely related to the literature in marketing, operations and economics that deals with the inefficiencies that are associated with use of intermediaries in distribution channels.
One of the primary sources of inefficiency is double-marginalization, which results when each individ-ual channel member adds its own margin to the cost of a product and leads to a final retail price that is higher than the one that would maximize total channel profits. Double-marginalization was first recognized by Spengler (1950) . Later, Jeuland and Shugan (1983) recognized its effects upon nonprice variables such as advertising, shelf-space allocation, etc. Because the double-marginalization that is introduced by the presence of intermediaries puts upward pressure on prices, it often has an adverse effect on total supply chain profits. However, as recognized by McGuire and Staelin (1983) , when the products of different manufacturers are highly substitutable, intermediaries can be beneficial because double-marginalization from using them mitigates the downward pressure on prices from competition. A number of others, including: Choi (1991), Ingene and Parry (1995) , Iyer (1998) , Lee and Staelin (1997) , Gupta and Loulou (1998) , and Gilbert et al. (2005) have studied various dimensions of double marginalization and how it is related to channel structure. However, these papers tend to focus on single period models that ignore the effects of product durability and how it might affect the interactions between manufacturers and dealers.
By explicitly modeling durability and the resulting choices between selling and leasing that are available to a manufacturer and dealer(s), our research bridges the gap between what is known about channel structure for non-durables and what is known about distributing durables directly to consumers. Moreover, because many durable products are distributed through dealers, the insights that we obtain about how the production / distribution cost structures and intensity of competition among dealers affect the equilibrium selling and leasing strategies should have practical significance.
Model Description
Let us begin by considering a manufacturer who distributes a durable product through a single dealer. We will extend this later to consider multiple competing dealers. Throughout the paper, we adopt the convention of using feminine pronouns to refer to the manufacturer and masculine pronouns for the dealer(s).
In order to represent durability, we adopt a variation of the two period linear demand model that Bulow (1982) proposed. In this model, it is assumed that the durable good lasts for exactly two periods. Although there is no depreciation of its value between periods 1 and 2, a discount factor of ρ is applied to revenues or cash flows received in period 2. The assumption that the durable good lasts for two periods is not critical; it is only important to assume that it lasts for a finite amount of time, so that optimal decisions can be calculated in a recursive fashion. The assumption that there is no depreciation is consistent with that of Bulow (1982) and Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) , and simplifies the presentation of our analysis. Although our model can be easily generalized to allow for depreciation, this would only blur the distinction between durable and non durable goods.
As in Bulow (1982) , we assume that consumers' utility for the product is defined by the value of the service it provides. In each period, there are a potential consumers, each of whom has valuation v for each period of service from the product and can consume at most one unit of it. The valuation v is distributed uniformly over the population on the interval [0, a] .
Given these assumptions, at a price p for one period of service of the product, all consumers who have a valuation of v ≥ p would be willing to pay for the service that the product provides. Thus the total number of consumers who would use the service of the product at a single period lease price of p is: q = (a − p) and the inverse demand function of the service that the product provides can be represented by:
However, because the product lasts for two periods, a consumer who buys a product in period 1 derives two periods of use out of it. Therefore, to determine the price that a dealer can obtain from any units that he sells in the first period, we must consider the additional value that a consumer will derive from buying instead of leasing the product. Let p 1 and p 2 be the market clearing prices for buying the product in periods 1 and 2, and let q l and q s denote the quantities that are made available for lease and for sale respectively in period 1. In period 2, the product will be used by all consumers with valuation v ≥ p 2 . In period 1, a consumer with valuation v would derive a total utility equal
(1 + ρ) v from using the product for both periods, implying that no consumer with valuation v < p 1 1+ρ
will buy in period 1. However, by postponing purchase until period 2, a consumer with valuation v would have a discounted expected net utility of ρ(v − p 2 ). Therefore, a consumer with valuation v will purchase in period 1 only if 
In equilibrium, consumers will be indifferent between leasing and selling in period 1, so the price at which q l units can be leased, given that q s units are sold is p(q l + q s ) = a − q l − q s , which is identical to the first term in (3.2). For the consumers who buy the product, this term represents the implicit lease price that they pay for the use of it during period 1. The second term represents the additional amount that they must pay for the use of the product in period 2 2 .
The second period price, p 2 , that consumers anticipate depends not only upon the first period quantities, but also on the cost structure and how it affects the incentives of the manufacturer and the dealer(s) in period 2. We assume that the manufacturer incurs a per-unit production cost of c m , and that the dealer incurs a per-unit transaction cost of c d . This transaction cost is intended to represent the cost of bringing a consumer into the dealership as well as the administrative costs of processing either a leasing or a sales transaction with him. This implies that by leasing a product to a consumer for two periods instead of selling it in period 1, the dealer incurs two transaction costs instead of only one. We assume that these costs are non-negative, and to facilitate the analysis, we require that:
Since condition (3.3) requires only that at least 37.5% of consumers have a valuation for the use of the product for a single period that exceeds its marginal cost, it is not terribly restrictive. We impose this condition only because, as the total marginal cost of the product increases, the manufacturer's second period wholesale price falls to her marginal cost, reducing the effects of time inconsistency. (For sufficiently large marginal costs, time inconsistency disappears altogether.) The purpose of assumption (3.3) is to guarantee that the equilibrium wholesale price offered by the manufacturer in period 2 is larger than her marginal cost. As will become clear later, this simplifies our analysis. However, we will also provide some discussion of how the relaxation of (3.3) affects our results.
We assume that the sequence of events in period 1 is as shown in Figure 1 : At the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer decides whether to sell or lease her product to the dealer and the price at which to do so. If the manufacturer leases to the dealer, then the dealer is forced to lease to the consumer. (He cannot sell a product that he does not own.) In this case, the dealer determines only the quantity to lease to the end consumer. On the other hand, if the manufacturer sells to the dealer, then the dealer must determine the quantity to sell and the quantity to lease to the end consumer.
In period 2, there is no distinction between leasing and selling since either one provides a single period of use of the product. At the beginning of period 2, the manufacturer determines a per-unit price, and the dealer responds by determining the quantity to obtain from the manufacturer. Any units that the dealer purchased in period 1 and leased to consumers remain in his possession at the beginning of period 2. To keep the analysis simple, we also assume that the manufacturer either sells all her products or leases all her products 3 . We consider these cases separately and identify optimal decisions for the manufacturer and dealer under each one.
Leasing by the Manufacturer
When the manufacturer leases the product to the dealer, ownership is retained by the manufacturer, forcing the dealer to lease, rather than sell, the product to consumers. The optimal decisions of the two firms can be calculated in a recursive fashion. Let w 1 and w 2 be the wholesale lease prices the manufacturer offers in the first and second period respectively. Let q 1 be the quantity that the dealer makes available to consumers in the first period and q 2T be the total quantity that the dealer makes available in second period. We denote the difference between these two quantities by q 2 = q 2T − q 1 .
Given these pricing and quantity decisions, the total profits of the dealer and the manufacturer as functions of these decisions are:
where the superscript DL indicates Dealer profit when the manufacturer Leases, and ML indicates
Manufacturer profit when the manufacturer Leases. It can be seen that the dealer's profit, Π DL , is separable in q 1 and q 2T . As a result, in each period t ∈ {1, 2}, the dealer's response is:
From the manufacturer's perspective, units that are produced in period 1 can generate leasing revenue for two periods, whereas units produced in period 2 can generate leasing revenue for only one period. Because the production costs and the demand for the service of the product are stationary, the manufacturer should set the same wholesale lease price in both periods. Given this, it is easy to confirm that the optimal price at which the manufacturer should lease to the dealer is:
Substituting the optimal wholesale price and quantities into the profit functions (3.4) and (3.5), we can find the profits of both the manufacturer and dealer as functions of the production cost c m and distribution cost c d .
Selling by the Manufacturer
When the manufacturer sells her product to the dealer, ownership transfers so that the dealer has the option of either selling or leasing it to the consumer in period 1. Recall that, in period 2, leasing and buying are indistinguishable since either one provides a single period of use. Let w t be the wholesale price at which the manufacturer sells the product to the dealer in period t = 1, 2. Let q 1 represent the total quantity that the dealer makes available in the first period and let q 2 be the additional quantity that the dealer makes available in the second period. Note that this notation is distinct from that used in the previous section ( q 1 , q 2 , w 1 , w 2 ) where the manufacturer was assumed to lease to the dealer.
When the manufacturer sells to the dealer in period 1, the dealer has the option of selling instead of leasing some or all of the q 1 units to the consumers. Let q s (w 1 ) and q l (w 1 ) represent the quantities the dealer sells and leases to consumers when the manufacturer sells to him at a wholesale price of w 1 in period 1, where q l (w 1 ) + q s (w 1 ) = q 1 (w 1 ).
At the beginning of period 2, the dealer continues to own all of the units that he leased to consumers in period 1. Although the dealer has no obligation to make these units available to the market in period 2, it can be verified that, because demand is stable, a dealer will never procure units in period 1 that will not be used in both periods. Thus, the total quantity made available to consumers by the dealer in period 2 will be q l + q 2 . In addition, the q s units that the dealer sold in period 1 are also available to satisfy consumers' demand for the service of the product. Since the product will be used by consumers with the highest valuations, all consumers with valuation of v ≥ a − q 1 − q 2 must have a non-negative net utility and the price at which the dealer would be able to sell / lease q l + q 2 units of the product in the second period is:
Although the market price in period 2 depends only upon the total number of units available to consumers, q 1 + q 2 , we will soon see that the equilibrium value of q 2 depends on the extent to which the units made available in period 1 were either sold or leased. Proceeding with the standard backward induction approach, the profits of the dealer in the second (final) period, can be expressed as:
Differentiating (3.10) twice with respect to q 2 , it can be seen that the dealer's profits are concave in q 2 .
Hence first-order-conditions (FOCs) are sufficient to characterize the dealer's second period quantity:
When the manufacturer determines her second period wholesale price, w 2 , she anticipates this quantity decision by the dealer. So the second period profit function for the manufacturer:
Since (3.12) is concave in w 2 , we can use FOCs to find the optimal second period wholesale price of the manufacturer is:
Note that assumption (3.3) insures that, in equilibrium we will have:
(3.13), it can be seen that each unit that the dealer either sold or leased in period 1 serves to decrease the wholesale price that the manufacturer offers in period 2. However, units that the dealer leased have twice as much impact as the units that he sold. The reason for this can be explained as follows:
Given that, in period 2, the dealer does not withhold any of his first period leased units (q l ) from the market, then all of the units that he leased or sold drive down the price at which he can sell additional units. However, only the units that he leased generate revenue for him in period 2. Therefore, when the dealer considers buying additional units from the manufacturer in period 2, he worries about the effect that these units will have on the revenues that he is able to earn from the q l units that he leased, but he cares nothing about the impact upon the value of the q s units that he sold. Because of this, the leased units have a stronger negative effect upon the dealer's second period marginal revenue from ordering additional units than do the sold units. By leasing a larger fraction of his total first period quantity to consumers, the dealer credibly commits himself to a lower marginal revenue function in period 2, to which the manufacturer responds by offering a lower wholesale price in period 2.
Substituting (3.13) and (3.11) back into (3.10) and (3.12), the second period profits of the dealer and manufacturer are the following functions of the first period decisions:
In the first period, when the dealer determines his leasing and or selling quantities, he seeks to maximize his total profits from both periods. If there are a total of q 1 = q l + q s units available to consumers, then the market clearing price for the leased units (as well as the implicit leased price for the units that are sold) will be a − q 1 = a − q l − q s . From (3.2) and (3.9) the market clearing price for the units that are sold will be p 1 (q l , q s ) = a − q l − q s + ρp 2 (q l + q s , q * 2 (w * 2 )), where we have omitted explicit reference to the fact that both q * 2 and w * 2 depend on q l and q s . Note that, because of the functional dependence of q * 2 and w * 2 upon q l and q s , the selling price depends upon how the total number of units in period 1 is divided between leasing and selling. The dealers total profits from both periods are:
and the dealer tries to maximize Π DS 1 (q l , q s ) subject to the constraint that q l , q s ≥ 0. Define q FOC l (w 1 ) and q FOC s (w 1 ) to be the values of q l (w 1 ) and q s (w 1 ) for which both of the FOCs for (3.16) are satisfied. It is easy to confirm that:
There are three types of responses that the dealer might make to a given wholesale price: a hybrid response in which he both sells and leases some units, a pure leasing response, in which he does no selling, and a pure selling response in which he does no leasing. 
Finally, let q PS s (w 1 ) be the selling quantity that satisfies the dealer's FOC given that q l = 0, and let q PL s (w 1 ) be the leasing quantity that satisfies the dealer's FOC given that q s = 0,. Formally, q PS s (w 1 )
is the value of q s for which dΠ DS 1 (0,q s ) dq s = 0, and q PL s (w 1 ) is the value of q l for which
We can now characterize the dealer's optimal leasing and selling response, denoted by q * l (w 1 ) and q * s (w 1 ), to wholesale price w 1 in period 1.
, the dealer will adopt a hybrid policy of both leasing and selling, and the quantities will satisfy: q
, the dealer will adopt a pure leasing policy in which q
, the dealer will adopt a pure selling policy in which q * l (w 1 ) = 0, and q
The fraction of the total units that the dealer leases in the first period can be represented as a function of the wholesale price at which the manufacturer offers to sell them:
. , and is non-increasing otherwise.
Let w Max
As we see in the above proposition and the accompanying corollary, when the wholesale price is sufficiently low, the dealer employs a hybrid policy, employing both leasing and selling. As the wholesale price increases, the dealer reduces the amounts of both leasing and selling, until he completely stops doing first one of them and then the other. Whether he stops selling before or after he stops leasing depends upon the relationship between the costs of production and distribution. It is easy to confirm that w 0L (c m , c d ), the wholesale price above which the dealer stops leasing, is decreasing in c d while w 0S (c m , c d ), the wholesale price above which the dealer stops selling, is increasing in . Thus, when the cost of distribution is high, as the wholesale price increases, the dealer switches from a hybrid policy to one of pure selling; when the cost of distribution is low, he switches from a hybrid policy to one of pure leasing. In this latter case of low distribution costs, even though the absolute amount of leasing decreases in w 1 , the fraction of units in use that are leased, α * (w 1 ), is increasing.
The dealer's motivation to sell is driven purely by operational efficiency. By selling a unit in period 1, the dealer interacts with a consumer only once, whereas if he leases it, a second interaction is required in period 2. However, his motivation to lease is driven by strategic reasons: Because the dealer retains ownership of the units that he leases in the first period, these units cause a downward shift in the marginal revenue that he can earn from making additional units available in period 2.
Consequently, leasing provides a mechanism for the dealer to credibly commit to a lower number of additional units being brought to the market in period 2. Because consumers rationally anticipate that there will be fewer units in use in period 2, leasing helps to overcome the time inconsistency problem. In addition, because units that the dealer leases put more pressure on the second period wholesale price than do those that he sells, leasing gives the dealer some leverage with respect to the manufacturer. When distribution costs are low, the dealer is far more concerned with mitigating time inconsistency and obtaining leverage vis-a-vis the manufacturer than he is with avoiding a second transaction with the consumer. However, when the distribution costs are high, then the incentive to avoid unnecessary consumer transactions dominates the strategic advantages of leasing.
At the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer determines the price, w 1 , at which she will sell to the dealer. Her profits are the following function of the wholesale price that she offers and the quantities that the dealer leases and sells respectively:
Note that, to facilitate the analysis of the manufacturer's optimal pricing policy for selling to the dealer, we have defined Π MS 1 (w 1 , q l , q s ) for arbitrary q l and q s . When we account for the dealer's optimal response, the manufacturer's profits are: Π MS 1 w 1 , q * l (w 1 ), q * s (w 1 ) where q * l (w 1 ) and q * s (w 1 )
behave as described in Proposition 3.1. To characterize the manufacturer's conditionally optimal wholesale price given that he sells to the dealer, we need to introduce some additional notation: Let Proposition 3.4. The manufacturer's optimal pricing policy for selling to the dealer can be characterized according to the three thresholds on the dealer's cost of distribution relative to the manufacturer's cost of pro-
Given that the manufacturer sells to the dealer, the equilibrium fraction of leasing can be repre-
.
Corollary 3.5. α * (c d , c m ) is non-increasing in c d and c m .
As we can see above and in Figure 2 , the optimal wholesale price offered by the manufacturer can fall into four regions depending on the cost of distribution relative to the cost of production. For a given value of production cost, c m , when the cost of distribution is very low, the manufacturer sets his wholesale price above the threshold w 0S (c d , c m ) so that the dealer responds with a pure leasing policy. For these low values of distribution cost, the dealer benefits more from mitigating time inconsistency than he is hurt by the operational efficiency of having more than one transaction with a given consumer. While this causes the manufacturer to cede some leverage to the dealer, inducing the dealer to sell some of the units is more costly because the manufacturer would need to offer a significantly lower wholesale price in the first period. However, as the dealer's cost of distribution increases, the penalty the dealer faces for additional consumer transactions increases, as result of which he is more easily induced to sell. When the distribution cost exceeds c 1 (c m ), the manufacturer would benefit from setting her price to w H 1 < w PL 1 to induce a hybrid policy from the dealer. Because w H 1 < w PL 1 at the point where c d = c 1 (c m ), the manufacturer's wholesale price, w * 1 , as well as the dealer's quantities, q * l and q * s , and profits are discontinuous at this point.
As the cost of distribution continues to increase, operational efficiency becomes more important relative to time inconsistency. The manufacturer's wholesale price decreases, due to the higher costs incurred by the dealer, and the dealer decreases both q l and q s . However, because q l decreases faster than does q s , leasing represents a decreasing fraction of the the total amount that the dealer buys, until for sufficiently large values of c d , we will have α * (c d , c m ) = 0. This is a result of the dealer's attempt to balance his own trade-off of operational efficiency against the strategic issues of time inconsistency and leverage vis-a-vis the manufacturer.
The Manufacturer's Decision to Lease or Sell to the Dealer
Prior to the first period, the manufacturer decides whether to lease or sell the the product to the dealer. Our analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 addressed the decisions of the manufacturer and the dealer given that the manufacturer decides to either lease or sell. Because of the non-linear nature of the the manufacturer's pricing policy with respect to costs c m and c d , a complete characterization of when the manufacturer will lease to the dealer is extremely tedious. However, the following partial characterization provides some useful insights. Recall that when c d ≥ a−c m 9 , if the manufacturer sells to the dealer, the equilibrium will be either a hybrid policy or a pure selling policy by the dealer. Thus, the manufacturer will never lease to the dealer for the purpose of forcing him to lease when he would otherwise adopt a pure selling policy. , any leasing that the dealer does is minimal. Therefore, the resulting downward pressure on the manufacturer's second period price will be small. Part b) of Proposition 3.6 provides an interesting contrast with the results that Bulow (1982) obtained for a centralized distribution channel. In Bulow's model, production and distribution costs are normalized to zero, and it is optimal for a manufacturer who does not rely upon an intermediary to lease her product. However, our model shows that, when the manufacturer sells through an intermediary, there is a trade-off between time inconsistency and double marginalization. When the manufacturer sells to the dealer, the resulting lease price charged to the consumer is lower than it would be if the manufacturer leased her product to the dealer, but it is also higher than the implicit lease price that the dealer would obtain from selling the product to consumers. Interestingly, as the production cost increases, the manufacturer's preference shifts to leasing. This is because, although selling counteracts double marginalization, it also results in production of units that are used only in the second period. Since the manufacturer's ability to charge a high wholesale price on these second period units is limited, the potential profits from these second period units relative to period 1 profits also shrinks as c m increases. By leasing to the dealer, the manufacturer can commit to producing only in the first period and obtain operational efficiency in this regard.
A complete characterization of the equilibrium can be done numerically and it is presented in Figure 3 . As can be seen in the figure, when the cost of distribution is low, leasing is the dominant mode of distribution. We see that either the manufacturer leases to the dealer forcing him to lease to consumers or the manufacturer sells to the dealer who in turn leases it to consumers. However, as the cost of distribution increases, the manufacturer's and dealer's preference for selling increases. In particular, there exist thresholds on the cost of distribution above which the dealer either pursues a hybrid policy or a pure selling policy. It is also interesting to note that these thresholds are decreasing in the production cost of the manufacturer. As c m increases, the manufacturer sells the durable good to the dealer over a broader range of values of c d and the dealer employs more selling in his own policy. Recall that the dealer's incentive to lease is that it allows him to make a credible commitment to introduce fewer additional units in period 2. However, because the number of additional units that he would have introduced is decreasing in c m and c d , the dealer's need to make such a commitment decreases as these costs rise. Similarly, as c m increases, the manufacturer has less need to make a commitment against lowering her second period price, and consequently she sells the durable good at even lower values of c d .
Recall that we have limited our analysis to the case in which c d + c m ≤ 5 8 a. Although this is not restrictive, it is of some interest to know what happens when this assumption is relaxed. When the combined marginal costs of production and distribution exceed 5 8 a, we are no longer guaranteed that, when the manufacturer sells to the dealer, the manufacturer's second period wholesale price in (3.13) will be larger than her marginal cost of production. When c m >
, the manufacturer would optimally set her second period price to equal to her marginal costs, which would induce the dealer to order less in the second period. In anticipation of lower second period quantities, the wholesale price that the manufacturer could obtain in the first period would also be higher. When the total marginal cost, c d + c m , becomes sufficiently large, no additional units would be produced in the second period and time inconsistency would disappear. This would eliminate the strategic considerations from the decisions to sell or lease the product, leaving only the issue of operational efficiency. Thus, for these large total marginal costs, both the manufacturer and dealer would be better off if the dealer sold the product to eliminate unnecessary transactions.
Channel Structure under Competition
So far our analysis has focused on how the costs of production and distribution affect the equilibrium selling, leasing and pricing decisions of a single manufacturer and dealer. However, competition among dealers is another important dimension of this problem. Moreover, in many durable goods markets, the manufacturer relies upon multiple intermediaries that may serve overlapping consumer markets. To address the issue of inter-dealer competition, we modify our original model to all for n dealers competing against one another. Let θ ij ∈ [0, 1] represent the degree of substitutability between dealer i and j. For simplicity, we assume that the substitutability of the different dealers is symmetric, i.e. θ ij = θ∀i, j; i = j. With this assumption, the inverse demand function for the service that the durable good provides when supplied by dealer i is:
where q j is the quantity of products currently in use that was supplied by dealer j. Note that the intensity of competition is increasing in both n and θ.
Since our objective in this analysis is understand the role of competition, we normalize the marginal cost of production and distribution to zero (c m = c d = 0) and assume that there is no discounting for period 2 (ρ = 1). While this assumption simplifies the presentation of our results, it also allows for a direct comparison with existing results that consider competition in the absence of intermediaries (Bucovetsky and Chilton, 1986; Desai and Purohit, 1999) . We will perform the analysis in the same way that we did in §3, where we first characterized the equilibria conditioned on whether the manufacturer sells or leases to the dealer, and then determined the conditions under which the manufacturer should sell or lease to the dealer.
Leasing Strategy by the Manufacturer
We begin by considering the situation where the manufacturer leases to dealers, denying them the option of selling to the end consumer. Let w 1 and w 2 be the wholesale lease prices the manufacturer offers in the first and second period respectively. We assume that these prices cannot be dealer specific, so that the manufacturer must offer the same price to all dealers in each period. Let q i1 be the quantity that dealer i makes available to consumers in the first period and q i2T be the total quantity that dealer i makes available in second period. We denote the difference between these two quantities by q i2 = q i2T − q i1 . To indicate the n-dimensional vectors of these variables, we will use bold-face q 1 , q 2 , and q 2T . This notation is consistent with that used in Section 3.1 except that we have added an additional subscript to distinguish among different dealers' quantities. The optimal decisions of the two firms can be identified in a recursive fashion.The profits of i th dealer from both periods can be represented as follows:
As in our earlier analysis, the dealer's profits are separable in q 1 and q 2T . As a result, in each period the FOC for dealer i is:
Note that the dealers' response to the wholesale lease price and to one another's quantities is the same in both periods. By simultaneously solving (4.26) for all n dealers, we can obtain the following expression for the total quantity in use as a function of the wholesale lease price offered by the manufacturer:
The manufacturer takes this response function as given and determines the wholesale price that would maximize her profits. The profits of the manufacturer are:
The wholesale price that maximizes the manufacturer profits from leasing to the dealers is: w * 1 = w * 2T = w * = a 2 . Substituting the optimal wholesale price and quantities into the profit functions, we can find the equilibrium profits of the manufacturer, denoted Π ML (n, θ), and of each dealer, denoted Π DL (n, θ), as functions of the parameters of competition in the downstream market.
Selling Strategy by the Manufacturer
Now we consider the case in which the manufacturer sells the product to dealers. Let w 1 and w 2 be the prices at which the manufacturer sells the product in periods 1 and 2 respectively. In period 1, we denote the quantities that dealer i sells and leases respectively as q is and q il , and the total quantity purchased by dealer i in period 1 by q i1 = q is + q il . In period 2, we denote the total quantity distributed by dealer i by q i2T . As was the case in our previous analysis, this total second period quantity includes all of the units that dealer i leased in period 1, plus any additional units, denoted q i2 that he purchases from the manufacturer in period 2, i.e. q i2T = q il + q i2 . To indicate the ndimensional vectors of these variables, we will again use bold face.
In period 2, the manufacturer announces a single wholesale price to all n dealers, and each dealer responds by determining the quantity that he will distribute in period 2. Recall that, in period 2, there is no distinction between selling and leasing, and that at equilibrium, a dealer will never withhold units from the market in period 2 that he procured from the manufacturer in period 1. The second period profits of dealer i are the following function of the first and second period quantities and the second period wholesale price:
Applying the FOCs to (4.29) for all n dealers gives us n simultaneous equations, the solution to which yields the conditional equilibrium response of dealer i as a function of the first-period quantities and the second period wholesale price:
When the manufacturer determines the second period wholesale price, she anticipates this response function and sets her wholesale price to maximize her own second period profits:
Applying FOCs to (4.31), we can see that the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer in period 2 is the following:
As was the case in our analysis of a single dealer, each unit that was sold or leased in period one decreases the wholesale price that the manufacturer offers in period 2, but the effect is stronger for leased units than it is for sold units. However, when we consider the effect of competition, it is worth noting that:
As the number of dealers becomes large, the marginal effect upon the second period wholesale price from an additional unit procured by an individual dealer does not depend upon whether that unit is leased or sold. Thus, as competitive intensity increases, there is less incentive for dealers to lease as a means of influencing the second period wholesale price that will be offered by the manufacturer.
We can now substitute (4.30) and (4.32) back into (4.29) and (4.31) to obtain the following expressions for the profits of dealer i and the second period profits of the manufacturer conditioned on the first period quantities:
In period 1, consumers anticipate how the period 2 market price for the product will be influenced by the number of units that were sold to consumers in period 1 as well as by the decisions of the manufacturer and dealers. Specifically, consumers can infer that if q l and q s are the vectors of quantities that each dealer leased and sold respectively, then the second period market price for the product will be the following:
This expression for the second period market price is based on the fact that the total number of units that will be available in period 2 include all of the units that were either sold or leased in period 1 as well as any additional units that are produced in period 2. Let p il (q l , q s ) and p is (q l , q s ) represent the first period lease price and selling price respectively. By definition, the first period lease price must be the same as the inverse demand function for a single period of use from the product, i.e. p il (q l , q s ) = p i (q l + q s ). Because consumers can anticipate the second period market price from the quantities that are available in period 1, at equilibrium it must be true that p is (q l , q s ) = p il (q l , q s ) + p i2 (q l , q s ).
As in Section 3.2, the premium that a consumer is willing to pay to buy instead of lease the product is equal to the (discounted) market price that is anticipated in period 2, which is independent of the individual consumer's valuation for the use of the product. In period 1, the profits of dealer i can be represented as follows:
and each dealer seeks to determine the values of q il , q is ≥ 0 that maximize his own profits. By simultaneously solving the FOCs for all n dealers, it can be confirmed that for any w 1 , there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which q il (w 1 ) = q jl (w 1 ) and q is (w 1 ) = q js (w 1 ) for all i, j. Let us denote the quantities leased and sold in this symmetric equilibrium by q * il (w 1 ) and q * is (w 1 ) respectively. Depending upon the wholesale price, the number of dealers, and the substitutability parameter, the symmetric equilibrium will be either a hybrid policy in which both q * il (w 1 ) > 0 and q * is (w 1 ) > 0, a pure leasing policy in which q * is (w 1 ) = 0, or a pure selling policy in which q * il (w 1 ) = 0. Using notation similar to that used in Section 3.2, let q FOC il (w 1 ), q FOC is (w 1 ) be the solution to the following:
.., n; j = i q is = q js i = 1, ..., n; j = i As in Section 3.2, if q FOC il (w 1 ) ≥ 0 and q FOC is (w 1 ) ≥ 0, then these quantities represent a symmetric equilibrium response to wholesale price w 1 . Let w 0L (n, θ) be the maximum wholesale price for which q FOC il (w 1 ) ≥ 0, and let w 0S (n, θ) be the maximum wholesale price for which q FOC is (w 1 ) ≥ 0. To identify a pure selling equilibrium, let q PS is (w 1 ) be the solution to:
To identify a pure leasing equilibrium, let q PL il (w 1 )be the solution to:
Proposition 4.1. a) For w 1 ≤ Min w 0L (n, θ), w 0S (n, θ) ,there exists a symmetric equilibrium among the dealers in which each dealer adopts a hybrid policy of both leasing and selling, and the quantities satisfy
, then w 0L (n, θ) ≥ w 0S (n, θ), and for w 1 ≥ w 0S (n, θ), the symmetric equilibrium will be a pure leasing one in which each dealer sets q * il (w 1 ) = q PL (w 1 ) + and q
, then w 0L (n, θ) ≤ w 0S (n, θ), and for w 1 ≥ w 0L (n, θ), the symmetric equilibrium will be a pure selling one in which each dealer sets q * is (w 1 ) = q PS (w 1 ) + and q * il (w 1 ) = 0.
As we saw in Proposition 3.1, when the wholesale price is sufficiently low, the equilibrium among the dealers will be a hybrid policy which includes both leasing and selling. As the wholesale price increases, the dealers reduce both the amounts of selling and leasing until they stop doing one of them altogether. Whether they stop leasing or selling first depends upon the intensity of competition.
, the dealers shift from a hybrid to a pure leasing policy as w 1 increases. For larger values of θ, the dealers shift from a hybrid to a pure selling policy.
As shown by Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) and Desai and Purohit (1999) , competitive pressures among firms who distribute durable goods can create an incentive to sell. By selling, a dealer can lockup consumers in the first period, reducing the demand available to other dealers. When the intensity of competition is high, a dealer is more concerned with locking up consumers than he is with mitigating time inconsistency. Proposition 4.1 generalizes these results by endogenizing the wholesale price that the dealers pay for the durable product. Higher first period wholesale prices cause both dealers and consumers to anticipate higher second period prices, which reduces the time inconsistency penalty from selling in the first period to lock in consumers. However, higher first period wholesale prices also increase the difference between the extent to which leased versus sold units induce lower second period wholesale prices. Thus, if competitive pressures to lock in consumers are low, higher first period wholesale prices make leasing relatively more attractive to dealers. But if competitive pressures to lock in consumers are already high, then higher first period wholesale prices only amplify them.
In anticipation of the equilibrium response of the dealers to a given wholesale price, the manufacturer determines her first period wholesale price to maximize the following profit function:
Although it is possible to derive a complete characterization of the the manufacturer's optimal pricing policy that is analogous to the one derived in Section 3.2 , the expressions are extremely cumbersome. Since our main objective of this analysis is to obtain insights about how the number of dealers and the extent of substitutability among them affects the equilibrium selling and leasing strategies, we do not provide the complete characterization of the manufacturer's pricing policy. Instead, we provide a partial characterization that shows how it can be obtained numerically. To this end, let us define w HC (n, θ) = Min w H (n, θ), w 0S (n, θ), w 0L (n, θ) to be the wholesale price that maximizes the manufacturer's profits conditional upon inducing a hybrid response from the dealers. Similarly, let w PLC (n, θ) = Max w PL (n, θ), w 0S (n, θ) , and let w PSC (n, θ) = Max w PS (n, θ), w 0L (n, θ) , so that w PLC (n, θ) (w PSC (n, θ)) is the wholesale price that maximizes the manufacturer's profits conditional upon inducing a pure leasing (pure selling) response from the dealers. From Proposition 4.1, it follows that for θ ≤ −1+ √ 1−8n+8n 2 2n(n−1)
, the manufacturer can induce a pure leasing response and the wholesale price that maximizes her profits from this pure leasing response is w PLC (n, θ). Similarly,
, the manufacturer can induce a pure selling response and the wholesale price that maximizes her profits from this pure selling response is w PSC (n, θ). The following proposition follows from the above definitions of w 0L (n, θ), w 0S (n, θ), w PLC (n, θ), w HC (n, θ), and w PSC (n, θ). , then the wholesale price that maximizes the manufacturer's profits from selling to the dealers is w
, then the wholesale price that maximizes the manufacturer's profits from selling to the dealers is w * 1 (n, θ) = w PSC (n, θ) if and only if
For low values of competitive intensity, θ, the equilibrium will be either a hybrid or a pure leasing policy, whereas for high values of θ the equilibrium will be either a hybrid or a pure selling policy.
The Manufacturer's Decision to Sell or Lease to the Dealers
We now turn our attention to the question of whether the manufacturer will lease or sell her product to the dealers in equilibrium.
Proposition 4.3. For n = 1, the manufacturer will sell to the dealer and the dealer will adopt a pure leasing policy with respect to the consumer.
As we see above, for the case of a single dealer and negligible costs of production and distribution, the manufacturer should always sell her product and the dealer should always lease it. Note that this is consistent with part b) of Proposition 3.6, where we analyzed a manufacturer's interactions with a single dealer under a more general cost structure. By leasing, the dealer shifts his marginal revenue curve downward, providing a credible commitment to lower second period quantities for any wholesale price. As this encourages the manufacturer to offer a lower wholesale price, it counter-balances double marginalization. However, because consumers anticipate these lower wholesale prices, some time-inconsistency remains. In contrast, when there is more than one dealer, the manufacturer's selling policy does not counter-act double marginalization as effectively. , such that for any θ ≤ θ PL (n), the wholesale price that would maximize the manufacturers profits from selling to the dealers would be w * 1 (n, θ) = w PL (n, θ), and would induce the dealers to follow pure leasing policies. b) For any number of dealers n ≥ 2, if w * 1 (n, θ) = w PLC (n, θ), then the manufacturer should lease, rather than sell, her product to the dealers. c) For any number of dealers n ≥ 4, there exists a threshold level of substitutability θ PS (n) < 1, such that for any θ ≥ θ PS (n), the manufacturer should lease, rather than sell, her product to the dealers. d) For any substitutability parameter θ > 0, there exists a threshold number of dealers, n L (θ), such that, if n ≥ n L (θ), then the manufacturer should lease, rather than sell, her product to the dealers.
These results are illustrated in Figure 4 , which depicts the results of a computational study. When competition among multiple dealers is either very low or very high, the manufacturer may be better off leasing to them. Let us first consider why the manufacturer can benefit from leasing when there is low competitive intensity. Recall that we assume that the manufacturer must offer the same second period wholesale price to all n dealers. While this is often a practical or even a legal requirement, it implies that the effect of each dealer's first period order quantity upon the second period wholesale price decreases as the number of dealers increases. 4 Thus, for n ≥ 2 and sufficiently low levels of competitive intensity, θ, the manufacturer should lease to the dealers to eliminate time inconsistency altogether. If she sold her product instead, she could reduce double-marginalization but this would be dominated by the time inconsistency that would be introduced.
As the competitive intensity increases, the dealers' equilibrium response to a selling manufacturer shifts from one of pure leasing to a hybrid policy that includes both leasing and selling to the final consumer. As shown by Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) and Desai and Purohit (1999) , each dealer has an individual incentive to sell the product in order to lock-in future consumer demands.
Although this comes at the cost of introducing time inconsistency, this cost is borne collectively by all of the dealers. Thus, the opportunity to sell the product to the final consumer amplifies the intensity of competition among the dealers. For intermediate values of the substitutability parameter θ, the manufacturer should sell her product to the dealers because she benefits more from how this amplification of competitive intensity counter-acts double marginalization than she would from continuing to lease the product to the dealers and eliminating time inconsistency.
However, as the competitive intensity increases further, the dealers increase the amount of selling that they employ in their response to a selling manufacturer, and the market clearing prices approach the wholesale price. Since this reduces the double-marginalization effect, this would be unqualified good news for the manufacturer if it were not for durability. However, for a durable product, as competition among the dealers erodes the effects of double marginalization, the effects of time inconsistency remain. In the extreme case, where θ → 1 and n → ∞, double marginalization becomes negligible regardless of whether the manufacturer sells or leases to dealers and the manufacturer's profit converges to those of the monopolist studied by Bulow (1982) . By leasing to competing dealers, she can prevent them from selling, thus eliminating the effects of time inconsistency without paying a significant double marginalization penalty. This result is a striking contrast to that of Proposition 3.6 where we showed that, in the absence of competition among the dealers, the manufacturer will never lease to a single dealer who would otherwise engage a pure selling policy.
It is also of interest to contrast our result, that high levels of competitive intensity can lead to a pure leasing equilibrium, with the results of Bulow (1986) ; Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) and Desai and Purohit (1999) , who showed that the equilibrium amount of selling will increase with an increase in either the threat of entry or the intensity of competition among multiple firms that distribute a durable product. Although our results in Proposition 4.1 confirm this, we have shown that when the competitive industry is supplied by a monopolist manufacturer, intense competition can lead the manufacturer to lease the product, forcing the competitive downstream industry to lease too.
Managerial Implications and Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the important role that intermediaries can play in determining the extent to which a durable good is sold or leased in equilibrium. When intermediaries are present, the manufacturer faces a trade-off between the effects of double marginalization and those of time inconsistency. If the manufacturer sells her product, time inconsistency puts downward pressure on the retail price and serves as a counter to double marginalization. As a consequence, when the manufacturer interacts with a single dealer, unless production costs are very high, she is better off selling instead of leasing her product to the dealer. Thus, if the durable goods manufacturer in Bulow (1982) were to use a dealer to distribute her product, she would be better off selling instead of leasing to this dealer, even though the dealer would lease it to consumers. Our model of a single dealer also captures the effects of how the cost of production and consumer transactions affect the equilibrium selling and leasing strategies. As the cost of production increases, the manufacturer prefers to lease in order to avoid the inefficiency of producing units that will generate revenue in only period 2. As the cost of transacting with consumers increases, both the dealer and manufacturer benefit from the operational efficiency that selling allows by reducing the number of transactions.
When the manufacturer interacts with multiple dealers, the intensity of competition among the dealers also plays an important role in determining the leasing versus selling decisions. Assuming that the manufacturer must offer the same wholesale price to all of the dealers, then as the number of dealers increases, a policy of selling her product becomes less effective in mitigating double marginalization. Consequently, when the manufacturer sells through multiple dealers among whom the intensity of competition is low, the manufacturer is better off leasing instead of selling her product to them in order to eliminate the time inconsistency problem. At intermediate levels of competitive intensity, the manufacturer prefers to sell to the dealers since this enables her to exploit the dealer's incentive to sell the product to the consumer as a mechanism of amplifying the competitive pressure and mitigating double marginalization. However, when the intensity of competition becomes very large, then double marginalization becomes less significant. At high enough levels of competitive intensity, the problem of double marginalization becomes dominated by that of time inconsistency, and the manufacturer is once again better off leasing her product to the dealers. Thus, our results contrast with existing ones that do not consider the role that intermediaries can play in influencing the equilibrium amounts of leasing and selling in competitive environments.
Our results may help explain some recent developments in the automobile and entertainmentvideo industries. In the automobile industry, the availability of pricing information through the internet has made it easier for consumers to comparison shop, intensifying the competition among dealers. However, during this same period, leasing has increased (Sturgeon, 2005; Keel, 1998) rather than decreased as previous models would have suggested. It is worth noting that, in the automobile industry, although the consumer interacts with the dealer to obtain the lease, it is the manufacturer who retains ownership of the vehicle. Thus, the increased amount of leasing parallels the case in our model where the manufacturer leases to the dealer.
Although entertainment-videos (DVDs, VHS tapes) do not fit the traditional definition of durable products, they are consistent with our model of durability because they do allow a single unit to be consumed multiple times by the same or by different consumers. In the early days of this industry, the universal mode of operation was for movie distributors to sell VHS video-tapes to dealers, e.g. Hollywood, Blockbuster, etc., who then rented them to consumers. However, in past several years, two developments have occurred in this industry that are related to our analysis: First, the entry of major retailers, e.g. Wal-Mart, Target etc. as well as operational innovators like NetFlix, was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of videos that are sold rather than rented. This dynamic is consistent with the results of Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) and Desai and Purohit (1999) .
However, it is interesting to note that at the same time that competitive intensity was increasing, movie distributors began to introduce the practice of revenue sharing with the major dealers, e.g. Hollywood, Blockbuster, etc. Under revenue sharing, the studios sell the videos to the dealers at approximately marginal cost in return for sharing a pre-determined portion of the rental income. This is operationally similar to arrangement in which the movie distributor rents (leases) the videos to the dealers, and may have been a response to the increased competitive intensity.
We believe that it would be of interest to extend our analysis to include competition among the manufacturers of the durable good when they interact with dealers. Not only would it be interesting to analyze how the intensity of competition among manufacturers influences the selling and leasing strategies at both levels of the channel of distribution, it would be of interest to understand how durability would influence the equilibrium channel structure itself, i.e. whether the manufacturers would sell directly or through dealers. Finally an empirical investigation of these effects would also serve to improve our understanding of these markets. 
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